Agreement is an important social outcome often poorly handled by computer-mediated
where it is necessary to socially enact agreement (Daft, Lengel, & Trevino, 1987) . To do nothing or to be indecisive in such situations may be the worst of choices.
However, meta-analyses of groupware research suggest that although computer-mediated support can improve task focus and performance (Dennis, Haley, & Vandenberg, 1996; Pinsonneault & Kraemer, 1989) , it often reduces, or has no effect on, agreement and confidence (Fjermestad & Hiltz, 1999; McGrath & Hollingshead, 1991; McLeod, 1992) . For example, a comparison of face-to-face (FTF) and computer-mediated communication groups for both preferential and intellective tasks found no differences in task solution quality, but although seven of eight FTF groups reached consensus, only one of eight computer-mediated communication (CMC) groups did so (Adrianson & Hjelmquist, 1991) . As is common in such cases, the authors attributed the lower agreement to the computer medium's inability to transmit rich social influence context cues (Sproull & Kiesler, 1986) . In a collaborative writing task, CMC groups also had substantially more difficulty coordinating their work than FTF groups, leading the authors to conclude, "The major problem, achieving consensus about how to proceed, seems much less amenable to technological intervention" (Kraut, Galegher, Fish, & Chalfonte, 1992, p. 391) . CMC groups also seem to take significantly longer to reach consensus than FTF groups (Hollingshead, 1993 ) and consistently report lower satisfaction (Straus, 1996) . The suggestion that computers support task rather than social interaction has a long research history (Hiltz, Johnson, & Turoff, 1986; Ho & Raman, 1991; Siegel, Dubrovsky, Kiesler, & McGuire, 1986) . However, there is an equally long history reporting no difference between CMC and FTF groups in generating agreement (Watson, DeSanctis, & Poole, 1988) , and in a recent review, 58 of the 67 studies measuring consensus showed no main effect for CMC by FTF (Fjermestad & Hiltz, 1999) . And, some studies report that CMC groups generate more consensus than FTF groups (Lea & Spears, 1991; Postmes & Spears, 1998) . Clearly, the issue is still open. Indeed, the problems of computer-mediated agreement seem no clearer now than 20 years ago, when two leading small group researchers observed, "In sum, there is substantial agreement among researchers and observers of small group tasks that something important happens in group interaction which can affect performance outcomes. There is very little agreement about just what that 'something' is" (Hackman & Morris, 1975, p. 49) . We propose that the generation of social agreement is a central aspect of group interaction. It is certainly becoming clear that group interaction is more than the simple exchange of factual information (Dennis, 1996) .
BACKGROUND
Early researchers conceptualized "group" as an entity with independent existence, postulating a "group mind" operating apart from its members (McDougall, 1921) . Lewin (1948) saw groups as entities in the individual's "life space" of psychological events. Such conceptualizations were cut short by Allport's (1924) view of group as a nominal fallacy, stated in his famous dictum, "There is no psychology of groups which is not essentially and entirely a psychology of individuals" (p. 4). Consequently, group cohesion became defined as "the resultant of all the forces acting on members of a group to remain in the group" (Festinger, Schachter, & Back, 1950, p. 274) . It has generally been operationalized as the sum of the interpersonal attractions between group members (Shaw, 1992) , considered to be "the 'cement' binding together group members" (Schachter, 1951, p. 229) , and widely regarded as the main cause of group agreement (McGrath & Kravitz, 1982) . This separated group interactions into task and socioemotional, implying distinct cognitive processes for task and socioemotional information (Bales, 1950) . The reduced bandwidth of computer communication provided a ready explanation of the problems of early computer-mediated interaction (Sproull & Kiesler, 1986 ) and implied computer communication without rich personal presence, or social context, would involve the dry and arid exchange of informational facts and figures. However, the computer communication explosion of the past decade has had scant regard for such expectations. E-mail, still mainly the exchange of lean black on white text, is anything but socially barren. Much of the information on the World Wide Web is text, yet sociologists now study the norms, beliefs, language, and socialization of Internet groups as they would any other human group (Giese, 1996; Surrat, 1996) . This contradiction between theory and practice has led to a wide divide between practitioners and researchers. We propose that the task versus socioemotional model behind these expectations, now more than 40 years old, needs to be reevaluated.
A COGNITIVE THREE-PROCESS MODEL
Social identity theory has reinvented the concept of group as a cognitive rather than physical entity, much as Lewin (1948) envisaged (Abrams & Hogg, 1990) . Its main proposition is that the influence of the group is distinct from the direct personal influence of the people in it and also from any physical benefits of group membership. As evidence, it has been shown that cohesiveness can occur in groups that mediate failure (Turner, Hogg, Turner, & Smith, 1984) and also in groups whose members have poor interpersonal relations (Hogg & Turner, 1985; Turner, Sachdev, & Hogg, 1983) . This view implies that Bales's (1950) socioemotional factor is really dual and can be split into a social (or group influence) factor and an emotional (or personal influence) factor. A recent computer-mediated study strongly supports this view (F. J. M. Reid, Malinek, Stott, & Evans, 1996) . This separation is also supported by a meta-analysis showing that computer depersonalization does not in general reduce group influence (Postmes, 1997) , a view proposed by the social identity model of deindividuation (Reicher, Spears, & Postmes, 1995; Spears & Lea, 1992) . This gives a theoretical position with three, not two, core cognitive processes driving group interaction (Whitworth, Gallupe, & McQueen, 2000 2. Relating to others: Using and contributing to personal influence, which allows small, usually dyadic, interactive relationships, ideally resulting in trust, mutual understanding, and intimacy. 3. Representing the group: Using and contributing to normative influence, which allows groups of any size to maintain a common identity and act as one, ideally resulting in group unity of action or agreement.
This cognitive three-process (C3P) model proposes three inherently distinct processes, with different purposes, which can operate independently. However, in normal FTF group interaction, they work in parallel across the same behavior set, and their purposes complement each other (although they often impose contradictory demands on group members). This overlap is possible because the proposed processes are cognitive and their effects can confound in behavior. For example, the behavioral state of agreement can arise from any or all of informational influence (following common facts), personal influence (following commonly trusted individuals), or normative influence (following a common group position). This situation of having to infer causal processes is not new to research. Agreement can also arise by chance in a group of randomly responding individuals. Probability theory helps distinguish chance from nonchance effects based on the properties of a random theoretical process. Similarly, each of the three processes has properties that allow it to be distinguished as a cause. For example, agreement from task information analysis should require task information exchange, agreement from personal influence should require signed interaction, and agreement from normative influence should require group position information.
The C3P model suggests that the purpose of normative influence is to allow unity of action in a group choice situation-much as a herd or flock must stay together when moving-or the group as an entity will cease to exist. Intellectual choices can be seen as a form of behavioral choice and intellectual decisions as intended behavior, so this same process can be evoked by group choice situations (where choice consequences accrue to the entire group). The C3P model proposes that normative influence is the primary means by which groups generate action agreement, and that it can operate independently from informational and personal influence. Computer-mediated experiments provide evidence for this, showing that "persuasive arguments" (Vinokur & Burnstein, 1974) are not necessary for normative influence and that how much individuals move to a common position seems unaffected by removing arguments from simple position information (Sia, Tan, & Wei, 1996) . This suggests that the exchange of position information alone can create agreement, even without the exchange of arguments. This is not to say that task IE cannot cause agreement, but in this model, it is not considered the primary means groups use to generate agreement nor necessary for that process.
What is necessary is that the individuals perceive themselves as members of a group (i.e., identify with the group), that the group is facing a behavioral choice with common consequences, and that group members can compare their choice position to that of the group. In a discussion, a member's position (e.g., agree or disagree) may be implied by his or her comments, and this has also been called the comment "valence" (Hoffman & Maier, 1961) . For each group member to be aware of the dynamically changing position information of all other group members requires many-to-many (MTM) interactive communication, and this, not richness, is proposed to be the prime requirement for groups to enact social agreement.
If normative influence can operate independently from personal relating, social generation of agreement should be independent of anonymity, contradicting views such as, "Groups operating under higher levels of anonymity will have lower levels of group cohesiveness, unanimity, and member influence than will groups operating under lower levels of anonymity" (Valacich, Dennis, Jessup, & Nunamaker, 1992, p. 106, Proposition 4) . By comparison, anonymity has no effect on computer-mediated group polarization (Sia et al., 1996) , another effect attributable to group influence (Hogg, 1992) . The C3P model also suggests that enacting agreement does not require the surfacing and resolution of nascent conflict (McGrath, 1990) , as normative influence disregards logic and individuals.
In summary, current theories suggest the social enactment of agreement in group choice situations requires the following:
If this is correct, groupware theory and practice based on the socialtask dichotomy must be expanded to accommodate a third process.
The research question addressing these conflicting theoretical predictions was the following: Given a computer-mediated group that members identify with, facing a behavioral choice whose consequences accrue to the group, can normative influence alone, without personal or informational influence, generate group agreement?
HYPOTHESES
The proposed normative process requires that participants see themselves as members of a group facing a choice situation and are aware of both their own and the group's choices. For a democratic group, the group position is that of the majority. If the normative process can operate independently, these conditions alone should generate agreement (actual and perceived) and increase awareness of other group members. In addition, providing information on group members' positions tends to elevate confidence if there is agreement but to reduce it if there is disagreement (Sniezek, 1992) . If agreement increases and participants are aware of this, members' confidence in their (and the group's) position should increase. Their long-term acceptance of the group position, or commitment, should also increase, as this also correlates with confidence (Sniezek & Henry, 1990) , as does group-perceived correctness (Sniezek, 1992) . Finally, if normative influence is a natural group process, participants should be more satisfied when it operates. These arguments suggest that for participants in a computer-mediated group facing a common choice task:
Hypothesis 1: The exchange of anonymous group position information alone will increase a. group agreement, b. choice confidence, c. other group member awareness, d. perceived group agreement, e. public commitment to the group position, f. perceived group choice correctness, and g. perceived procedure satisfaction.
The null hypothesis was that there will be no group interaction effect.
Normative influence, like all other forms of influence, operates on the individual's uninfluenced or independent position. Position change will depend on the strength of the original position and the strength of the normative influence. The latter can be expected to vary with the degree of the rest of group agreement (Whitworth & Felton, 1999) . If, after exchanging position information, members increase agreement, repeating the exchange will involve increased normative influence. Individuals who did not change position the first time may do so the second time if everyone else agrees against them. The effect should naturally diminish as the group unifies:
The exchange of group position information can be contrasted with the exchange of interpersonal confidence information. An individual's confidence indicates his or her state or feeling about something. It does not change the choice position taken. Confidence is essentially sender, not task or position information, and so is part of the C3P relating process. Relating is here proposed to involve the mutual exchange of sender information allowing a sense of closeness and trust. If IE is anonymous, as in this experiment, participants cannot recognize who communications are from, and so relationships cannot develop. If interpersonal relating cannot operate, information used primarily by that process should have no effect, hence:
Prediction 1: The exchange of anonymous confidence information will not affect any of the measures in Hypothesis 1.
A negative statement such as this cannot be proven, as a null hypothesis cannot be formulated, but it remains a prediction.
METHOD RESEARCH STRATEGY
The research strategy involved (a) minimizing C3P task information analysis and interpersonal processes and (b) manipulating support for the proposed normative process.
Personal influence was minimized by making interaction anonymous. Relating is difficult when who contributed what is unknown. Informational influence was minimized by excluding exchange of any descriptive information or argument regarding the choices facing the group. Supporting normative influence required a sequence of exchanges of group member position information. Removing that support required a control identical in every way, except for these exchanges. In this design, the same software supported both control and treatment (i.e., it was a computer-mediated versus altered computer-mediated design) (Burke & Chidambaram, 1995; Lea & Spears, 1991) . Effects found relative to the control can thus be attributed to the isolated process.
TASK
The research strategy of isolating normative influence excluded tasks requiring factual discussion of arguments or personal relationships and trust. In generative tasks, member positions are emergent rather than predetermined, making measurement of agreement difficult. Negotiation tasks do not involve a common group identity, and execution tasks fall outside the realm of computer interaction. This meant a choice task, either intellective or preferential. We chose a laboratory experiment to demonstrate unequivocally the process proposed under controlled conditions. Such methods are typically not realistic, as control, realism, and generality unavoidably present a "three-horned dilemma" to the researcher (McGrath, 1982) . That this process operates generally is predicted by the C3P model, but demonstration of this must be left to other studies. In this study, groups chose from four options, which allowed a precise measure of group agreement to be calculated (Whitworth & Felton, 1999) . This was repeated 12 times per set, 6 being intellective choices and 6 preferential (McGrath, 1984) . The intellective (right or wrong) questions followed the style of IQ tests (Australian Council for Educational Research, 1982; N. Reid, Jackson, Gilmore, & Croft, 1981) . The preferential questions followed the style of the estimates and information subtests of the Motivational Analysis Test, which were designed to vary with individual motivational differences (Institute for Personality and Ability Testing, 1975) . Three matched choice sets were created, one for each treatment level.
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
The main independent variable was IE, with three levels. For group aware and confidence aware, there were three exchanges or votes. Questions were of two types:
1. intellective and 2. preferential.
This gave a three-way randomized block factorial design (see Table 1 ). As participants chose their groups, repeated measures were taken: Every participant was under every treatment level. The design assumption of a circular covariance matrix (Winer, 1971) was confirmed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences Mauchly test for all main effects. There were six IE treatment orders and six ways three tests could be allocated to each treatment. This gave 36 session types, which for groups of 5 required 180 participants. Only 90 participants, however, were available. As an order effect was expected, IE treatment levels were randomly allocated equally to the first, second, and third order positions. The tests were also randomly allocated equally by order. It was not possible to also allocate tests equally to all treatments, so this was done randomly.
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Under the blind treatment, participants voted only once, unaware of others votes. The group aware treatment involved three votes per choice. The first was blind, but after that, group position information became visible. Participants could not second vote until all members of their group had voted once or third vote until everyone had second voted. The first two votes were straw votesparticipants could vote "don't know" if they had no opinion-but the final vote represented the group's answer and required they take a position. Position information was exchanged in the format:
Group Position: Option A
The above indicates three group members chose Answer A, one chose B, and one voted "don't know." Vote feedback was in order of choice option, not person voting, so it was anonymous. The format shows the group position as the majority (Option A) but could also show a blank field (indicating no decision yet) or report "Group Vote Hung" if no majority was possible (e.g., AABBC).
The confidence aware treatment required the exchange of confidence information. Trials showed a single confidence symbol was easy to understand and remember (see Table 2 ). The above shows that the majority choosing Option A were not at all confident, whereas the minority felt very confident Option B was the correct answer.
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DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Agreement
Agreement can be measured by commonality (the number of people with the same position) (Lorge, Fox, Davitz, & Brenner, 1958, p. 364) or consensus (the percentage of unanimous groups) (Sniezek, 1992) , but both measures ignore the varying degrees of agreement possible in groups. Some experiments have used a more sensitive measure based on fuzzy set theory (Sambamurthy & Chin, 1994; Tan, Wei, & Krishnamurthy, 1991; Watson et al., 1988) , but this only works with interval data, not nominal data such as limited-choice tasks usually produce, and requires data in the form of voting probabilities (Tan, Teo, & Wei, 1995) . The measure used in this study can be applied to interval, ordinal, and nominal data. It is based only on the actual voting pattern and hence can be applied to noninteracting groups. The situation involved N group members facing a problem with K choices. Disagreement was conceptualized as the square of the distance apart of the choice positions held by two group members. If they held the same position, the distance was zero, and disagreement was zero. Otherwise, for nominal data, their disagreement was one. Averaging the disagreements with other group members gives an individual's disagreement, and averaging across group members gives the group disagreement (D). This gives the following: where f j is the number of participants who chose the jth option, and for nominal data, d ij is 1 if i ≠ j, else it is 0. For nominal data, the maximum D is 1.0, so group agreement (A) can equal 1 -D (see Table 3 ). A detailed derivation is given elsewhere (Whitworth & Felton, 1999) . The minimum A of 0.0 (everyone disagrees) is not possible with 5 group members but only four choices. Table 3 indicates where the group moves from majority agreement to having no majority. Agreement scores were averaged over 12 items.
Confidence
Immediately after choosing one response option, participants were asked, "How confident do you feel that this answer is correct?" and could respond as follows:
5. very confident, 4. confident, 3. fairly confident, 2. not very confident, or 1. not confident at all.
If participants voted "don't know," this question did not appear. Participants were asked to choose "don't know" only if they had no confidence in any option. In this case, confidence was scored as 1 (not confident at all). Scores were averaged over 12 values. 
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Participants' Perceptions
Participants' perceptions of the interaction were measured on the constructs in Table 4 . Each was measured by both a positive and negative question, to counter response bias. The questions were given in a mixed order. Participants answered on a 7-point scale: 7 = strongly agree, 6 = agree, 5 = agree slightly, 4 = in the middle, 3 = disagree slightly, 2 = disagree, and 1 = strongly disagree.
Score Correct
The six intellective items in each set allowed a task performance measure. Score correct, the group's total correct answers, was a value from zero to six. If the group could not agree (a hung vote), the answer was marked incorrect. No hypothesis was formed for score correct as it is not logically independent from agreement. A group must agree, or form a group position, before that position can be judged correct or not. A group that cannot agree cannot be correct. Conversely, if they can agree even with no task knowledge, for a limited choice task, they will occasionally be correct by chance.
Where participants tend to be correct (e.g., an easy task), normative influence should improve score correct, but where they tend to be incorrect (e.g., a cognitive bias), it should reduce score correct. Normative influence can be expected to crystallize the group in either direction (Thorndike, 1938) . The expected effect depends on whether the blind percentage correct is above or below chance.
PARTICIPANTS
Participants were 90 first-and second-year students from business and computer courses, approximately equally male (56%) and female (44%). Most were between 18 and 20 years old, with no prior groupware experience. They were invited to form groups of 5 for a competition, with a stated first prize of movie tickets, plus a small course credit, as an individual incentive. Freedom to choose their groups meant participants accepted their group membership. Students were asked to devise group names and took a keen interest in coming up with names such as the Lamborgreenies and the Smelly Cats. This also helped establish group identity.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
The experimental procedure was as follows. were placed so members could not see the screens or faces of others in their group. 3. Preliminary questionnaire: Participants answered a short questionnaire to measure their group's nontask cohesiveness, in terms of belonging and morale (Bollen & Hoyle, 1990 ). 4. Introduction: Participants were told not to communicate FTF and that any group that did so could be disqualified. Monitors noted no attempts at FTF interaction. 5. Training: Participants answered three practice questions while group and confidence aware. This trained users in system mechanics, confirmed group identity, and established that the computers were operating correctly. After the first vote, some members were invited to publicly disclose their votes to establish the reality of the group situation, and any questions were answered. If no decision was made, they voted again. 6. Complete test and record perceptions (three times): After completing each test, participants individually rated their perceptions of that method (blind, group aware, or confidence aware). 7. Overall comments: Participants were asked, "How in general did you feel about these sessions?" and could make free-form comments on their experience. 8. Competition results: The scores of all groups were calculated and published. The winning group received movie tickets and the others a consolation prize packet of sweets.
SOFTWARE
The experiment required purpose-designed groupware. FORUM DGSS involved more than 10,000 lines of code. It was written by the first author over 3 years, then used by more than 1,000 people (for meeting agendas, an electronic magazine, and class feedback) before its experimental use. The experimenter could define the environment, using more than 150 interaction rules such as mail availability, add rights, and vote visibility. It was effectively a groupware environment generator (DeSanctis & Gallupe, 1987) . FORUM DGSS defined the treatments, gathered participant perceptions, and received final comments. It portrayed the group position in an understandable way, managed the MTM exchange of position information, and devolved control to group members (DeSanctis, Poole, Dickson, & Jackson, 1993) . Participants worked at their own pace, using the following main menu as a procedural "road map":
1. exit session, 2. practice, 3. practice feedback, 4. Set 1, 5. Set 1 feedback, 6. Set 2, 7. Set 2 feedback, 8. Set 3, 9. Set 3 feedback, and 10. comment on whole session.
Experimenter interaction was minimal. The main screen showed 12 choice items, with the current item shown in detail above the list. If it required voting, an eye-catching prompt flashed "Press V To Vote." Pressing the N button found the next question requiring voting.
RESULTS
DATA
FORUM DGSS generated 54 raw data files (three sets with 18 groups), giving 1,512 result records (12 questions by 18 groups for seven vote sets), each involving 5 people in two decisions (vote and confidence). There were 12 missing values (1 person missed a third vote), so some ANOVA calculations involved only 17 groups. The complete experiment involved more than 15,000 individual vote decisions. Of the 4,320 first and second votes, only 89 (or 2.1%) were "don't know."
IE EFFECTS
The mean blind agreement was 0.41, approximately a three to two split, and the group aware agreement averaged 0.84, nearly unanimous (see Table 5 ). This difference was highly significant (see Table 6 ), supporting Hypothesis 1a. The null hypothesis of no 642 SMALL GROUP RESEARCH / October 2001 group effect was rejected. The group and confidence aware treatments were not significantly different, as expected by Prediction 1. The results for vote confidence matched those for agreement, supporting Hypothesis 1b. Knowing the confidence of others, however, produced no additional benefit in agreement or confidence.
The group aware treatment significantly improved score correct (see Tables 5 and 6 ). The mean individual scores correct by treatment showed a similar pattern (3.07, 3.97, and 4.26). However, this effect could be due to normative influence, as the blind group was more correct (52%) than chance (25%). When calculated as a percentage of agreed group decisions, score correct actually fell slightly from blind (68%) to group aware (66%). The increase in score correct was entirely accounted for by the increase in agreement. This illustrates how operational measures can confound process effects. The results do not suggest participants are using other members' votes as rational task information to make better decisions (Deutsch & Gerard, 1965) . Interestingly, the small difference between group and confidence aware remained after this correction. The additional voter confidence information, although not significant here, may still weakly affect group agreement. The group and confidence aware tests took longer, the extra time reflecting the extra work done (see Table 5 ). Each group or confidence aware decision required three votes, and each vote took on average 27.3 seconds per question, compared to 35.0 seconds per question for a blind vote.
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The after-test questions all showed highly significant differences between the blind and group aware situations, except for one, and no difference between the group and confidence aware situations (see Table 7 ). Participants in the group aware treatment felt more aware of other members, more in agreement with the group, happier to sign their names to the group results, that the group's answers were more correct, and that this was a better way to make decisions, supporting Hypotheses 1c, 1d, 1f, and 1g. However, although signing one's name to the group answers was significant, making group results public was not. Perhaps, members do not feel personally responsible for group's public actions. Normative influence seems a powerful force in group decision making. As 1 participant noted, discovered the power of the group to influence others in decision making . . . very aware of the group in the decision-making process even though not being able to communicate with them. In the last test [blind] , it was very hard to make decisions without the support of the group.
VOTE NUMBER EFFECTS
Analysis by vote number showed when effects occurred: Did members move to agree immediately or wait until the final vote? Although most change occurred on the second vote, agreement and confidence also increased significantly on the third vote (see Tables 8 and 9 ). Group and confidence aware treatments showed similar vote change patterns, as would be expected from a common underlying process. The data show a curvilinear relation with diminishing returns. Hypothesis 2 was supported, suggesting normative influence continuously operates against the inertia of an individual's previous choice. If normative influence were a onetime effect, exchanging personal confidence may have had no effect because there was no room for further improvement. However, because normative influence had a continuing effect, if personal confidence had any influence, it should have added something. The results so far can be summarized: Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 1f, and 1g were supported. Hypothesis 1e was partially supported. Hypothesis 2 was supported, and Prediction 1 obtained the expected result.
QUESTION TYPE
There was a small but significant difference between the mean agreement for the intellective and preferential questions (0.36 vs. 0.39, SD = 0.31, 0.32, respectively, N = 750). Participants were also less confident on preferential questions than intellective ones (3.78 vs. 3.64). The main effects found were the same for both question types.
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INTERACTIONS
A multifactor repeated measures analysis showed no interactions between information exchanged, vote number, and question type (see Table 10 ). Where two interaction contrasts were calculated, the average is given.
CONTROL VARIABLES
A chi-squared analysis showed no significant treatment order effect. However, comparing agreement between tests (for the first vote) showed small but significant differences (see Table 11 ). Could these differences have caused the main effects? Even if each treatment had been done entirely with one test (which was not the case), the expected agreement difference would be only 0.06 (the Test A vs. Test B difference). The treatment difference found was 0.42, which is 7 times larger. However, the main effect could explain the test differences as the latter are all in the direction predicted by the uneven allocation of test to treatment (Tests A and C were allocated 15 and 12 times, respectively, to the group and confidence aware treatments, whereas Test B was only allocated 9 times).
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PREEXPERIMENT COHESION
Although belonging and morale correlated highly together (r = .794, p = .000), neither correlated with any later measure. The group influence found seems a property of the situation, not the standing group, and seems independent of individuals knowing each other personally, as was also found in the original conformity studies (Crutchfield, 1955) .
PARTICIPANT PERCEPTION CONSTRUCTS
Construct Correlations
It was expected that negative and positive responses would load together within each construct. However, the within construct correlations for two factors were not significant (see Table 12 ). It was difficult to see why "I think I agreed with most of what the group decided" did not correlate significantly with "I think I generally disagreed with what the group decided." This result was surprising, suggesting that agreeing and disagreeing with a group are not simple opposites.
Factor Analysis
A principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation was carried out on the average of the group and confidence aware 648 SMALL GROUP RESEARCH / October 2001 treatments (because both showed similar participant perception responses). Three factors emerged, accounting for 62% of average response variance (see Table 13 , loadings under 0.3 not shown).
Factor 1: Group Identification
Factor 1 loaded the positive questions from the perceived agreement, task correctness, procedure satisfaction, and public commitment constructs. It seemed to represent members' identification with the group and explained approximately one third of the response variance. All these questions correlated strongly and significantly with each other (see Table 14 ), suggesting a single underlying process affecting all variables and a single attitude to the group as a whole, including apparently distinct aspects. The correlation between task correctness positive and perceived agreement positive was particularly high (43% common variance), and agreeing with the group associated strongly with a belief that the group answer was correct. Participants' agreeing with bad answers just to "go along" with the group would have given a negative relation between task correctness positive and perceived agreement positive. As 1 participant commented, they liked the group because it generated good answers: "I liked working with our group. . . . Being able to see the votes and confidence of other team members enabled me to make a good answer." Because the experiment was designed so the main influence process operating was normative, this suggests that a significant proportion of participants' confidence in task solution correctness (more than 40%) can arise from the normative influence (without task information analysis).
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Factor 2: Individual Identification
Factor 2 loaded mainly negative group responses: how the individual disagreed with the group, felt it was often wrong, did not wish group decisions to be made public, did not think much of others, and did not enjoy the interaction method. This was interpreted as an assertion of individual identity apart from the group.
Factor 3: Other Awareness
The third factor loaded mainly the two other awareness questions. It was interesting that neither other awareness positive nor other awareness negative loaded on Factor 1, implying awareness of others and of the group are not the same thing. In this factor, procedure satisfaction negative correlated significantly with other awareness negative (r = .418) but not with other awareness positive. It appeared that not thinking of others related to not enjoying the session, but the reverse was not true.
OVERALL COMMENTS
Of 61 voluntary comments, 27 (44%) stated the group and confidence aware treatments were the best. Of these, 8 did not distin- guish the two treatments, but 19 felt the confidence aware method was clearly best. This was the most common theme of all mail messages:
Hmm, I felt the see votes and confidence was the best; it allowed as [sic] to compare our answers and change them if we felt the rest off [sic] the group had a valid point.
I think that the first way (votes and confidence) is the best one because it relates more to what can really happen during a meeting. I found the two others ways inefficient.
Test one [confidence aware] was really the only one that would be worthwhile, as it is much easier to make a group decision based on the weighting that each member gave their answer to each question.
The definitiveness of these views was surprising, given that the confidence aware method had no additional effect on either participants' choices or method ratings.
DISCUSSION
The experiment suggests that normative influence exists and is distinct from informational and personal influence. If this view is correct, it has major theoretical and practical implications.
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
Social Influence and Richness
This experiment found that the exchange of a few bytes of anonymous textual information was sufficient to produce major changes in group agreement. This lends credence to the few studies where distributed electronic groups have shown greater agreement than FTF groups, rather than less (Lea & Spears, 1991; Postmes & Spears, 1998; Sia et al., 1996) . By contrast, groups enacting agreement without a rich medium or rich IE are not predicted by cuesfiltered-out approaches such as media richness theory (Daft et al., 1987), social information processing theory (Walther, 1992) , or cues-restricted theory (Sproull & Kiesler, 1986) . Likewise, theories that see agreement arising from individuals exchanging rational information would not expect this effect (Huber, 1984; Malone, Grant, Turbak, Brobst, & Cohen, 1987) . Any theory that equates the group effect with the personal influence of the group's members would not expect anonymous computer-mediated interaction to support enacted agreement. These results also question the view that agreement generation requires the surfacing and resolution of conflict. No sources of conflict were investigated. No reasons were given to convince people to change position. No personal context or social presence was provided. No basis was offered for the development of trust, or persuasion of any form. There was certainly nothing that could be called a discussion. A more impersonal and information lean form of interaction could hardly be imagined, yet 66% of group aware decisions were unanimous (compared to 8.8% blind), and a majority decision was reached in all 204 cases. Although interpersonal relating may use rich sender context information, normative influence seems an impersonal process, based on the exchange of position information alone. It is the influence of the group as a whole, not the individuals in it.
Given participants were only exchanging a few characters of text without interesting discussions or personal involvement, we expected them to find the experiment boring. Yet, they attended sessions closely, looking with interest for the group view on each question. They responded as if the information exchanged was rich. Some even volunteered they found it fun: I enjoyed using this system. This was quite fun, however the blind test was annoying due to the fact that I could not compare my answers with other members of the group. This is a very interesting and wonderful way to make decisions.
Group position information seems naturally arousing, even without information about the task or other people. Its richness seems to arise because this information is important to people in groups.
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The Effect of Confidence
The exchange of vote confidence information in essentially the same manner as vote position had no effect on agreement or confidence. Adding awareness of the other's confidence did not improve confidence (what created confidence was congruence with the group position). Yet, of the comments mentioning treatment differences, 70% considered the confidence aware treatment the best method. Had interpersonal relating been possible, no doubt this would be true. However, in this experiment, anonymity meant relationships could not be formed, and so as the model predicted, confidence information had no effect. Participants were not influenced by the stated confidence of an anonymous communicator. A similar computer-mediated experiment, based on the Social Interaction Sequence model (Stasser & Davis, 1981) , predicted that exchanging confidence information would enhance agreement and tried three times to experimentally confirm this expectation. Each attempt gave the result predicted by the C3P model: no effect (Lowry, 1993) . The author concluded,
The results of this study suggest that a confidence feature may not be contributing to a distributed group's ability to reach agreement . . . . This finding is counter-intuitive; one would expect a participant to change his or her opinion more often when the majority has high confidence than when they have low confidence. (Lowry, 1993, p. 16) Such negative findings from studies of person-to-person influence have been incorrectly taken to imply that computer groups cannot generate social agreement. The C3P model suggests the focus has been on the wrong process.
Cognitive Processes
Once a physical process is defined and operating in place, no other process can operate in the same place unless the first process stops. This is not true for cognitive processes. We may respond a certain way because it is correct and because we wish to please someone and because it is a group expectation. Conversely, any cognitive process can influence any behavior. In this experiment, normative influence increased score correct as well as agreement, although the position information exchanged probably did not improve participants' task understanding. We can consider the change in score correct as a by-product of a cognitive process aimed at generating agreement. Likewise, better task information analysis can lead to higher agreement, if everyone calculates the "right" answer. In this case, agreement can be seen as a by-product of task analysis. Agreement could also be a by-product of better personal relationships. It is this confounding of multiple purposes in behavior that makes group interaction so difficult and subtle a topic of research. Fortunately, each process has distinct properties, allowing researchers to isolate processes and estimate effects. For example, in a computer-mediated brainstorming experiment, the following model was proposed for FTF groups (Casey, Gettys, Pliske, & Mehle, 1984) :
where P is performance and I is influence. The social influence term (I Social ) incorporates both the interpersonal and normative influences of the C3P model. Computer participants believed they were brainstorming with the aid of a computer but in fact were receiving the ideas of other group members, matching the FTF treatment in task information but not in social effect, as they had no basis to respond to social influence, giving
The experimental design allowed model components to be estimated from the results, showing that FTF social influence caused a massive performance decrement (-41%), whereas the positive synergy effect of factual IE was quite small (+6.5%) (the authors suggested even this effect was an artifact caused by participants' "tweaking" ideas to give variants recorded as different but really the same). This supports the conclusion of many FTF studies: that synergy is rare in groups (McGrath, 1984) . The negative effect of social influence seemed primarily because increasing the common 654 SMALL GROUP RESEARCH / October 2001 ideas (and agreement) reduced the number of different ideas brainstormed. The removal of the "negative" social factor seems the main cause of current computer brainstorming successes. A recent study suggests that electronic brainstorming provides little or no benefit over noninteracting or nominal groups (which also have no social influence) (Pinsonneault, Barki, Gallupe, & Hoppen, 1999) . Although normative influence is generally beneficial for groups, for the isolated and particular task of brainstorming, it is not (e.g., the same group influence process that reduces brainstorming performance increased score correct in this experiment). The C3P model suggests an extension of Casey et al.'s (1984) model:
In this experiment, the model (by design) was
That individuals were affected by both the group position (I Group ) and their own position (P Individual ) may explain the surprisingly low correlation between perceived agreement positive and perceived agreement negative. One participant reported, This comment expresses well a dynamic tension between normative influence and individual judgment. For important decisions, one might expect people to prefer more processes to be referenced; that is, perhaps important actions must not contradict known task information and argument (I Information ) and must involve people we trust as recommendors or sources (I Personal ), must be acceptable to the group we represent (I Group ). This offers a convincing reason why people in groups are often dissatisfied with computer-mediated interaction: It only offers task IE. For example, without knowing the source (based on relational IE), people may simply not believe the information exchanged by the computer (Dennis, 1996) . Unsolicited comments indicated that in this experiment, participants missed the availability of two other processes:
I found it slightly frustrating not being able to communicate or discuss the questions.
I felt the influence of others in my decisions. Where I felt my decision to be correct and saw the entire group disagree, I felt powerless to influence them.
Participants at times felt powerless to exert personal or rational influence on others. Although isolating an underlying psychological process is recommended for research purposes, practical groupware should involve all processes in a complementary manner.
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
The size of the normative effect suggests electronic voting could be a mainstream activity in groupware.
Electronic Voting E-mail seems to increase the number of interpersonal relationships people enter into, their "social connectivity" (Hiltz & Turoff, 1985) , by lowering the "messaging threshold" or psychological cost to the user of sending a message (F.J.M. Reid et al., 1996) . Messages are sent by e-mail that would not warrant a letter. This increased spontaneity means e-mail is seen as more akin to a telephone call than a written letter (Lea, 1991) . Electronic voting may be as different from our traditional concept of voting as e-mail is from traditional mail and may be different for the same reason: The computer makes things so easy. A FTF vote is a major effort in counting. In this experiment, each participant voted 168 times over a 1-hour period without obvious strain and many with obvious interest. The computer did all the work. Electronic voting may be the key to computer-mediated interaction in groups, just as e-mail was the key to CMC. Computer-mediated interaction involves 656 SMALL GROUP RESEARCH / October 2001 group-to-group connectivity, as well as person-to-person connectivity. This requires software designed for MTM rather than oneto-one linkage.
MTM Linkage
If communication richness is not the key to the generation of agreement, what is? We suggest the critical feature is MTM linkage, the merging of information from many individuals into a single signal that is then broadcast to all members. A physical medium such as sound does this naturally: When a crowd claps, individual sounds merge into the group sound each participant hears. But, although merging 100 claps creates a single powerful sound, merging 100 e-mails supporting the same view does not create a powerful e-mail (unless it be powerfully long, repetitive, and boring). MTM interaction can be dynamic, as in a choir where the individuals continuously affect the group sound and the group sound continuously affects the individuals. Such groups singing unaccompanied often slowly change key, but it is common experience that they always do so together. Electronic voting can achieve the same effects but in a way quite different from the traditional vote, which is a single, isolated, and occasional activity carried out in formal anonymity and used only when groups cannot agree by other means. Most current groupware voting seems designed on the concept of a formal, rational vote. Position information, if available at all, is buried in menus, not available at the moment of voting or not available in the form of a group position (e.g., mean of 4.3 vs. slightly agree). Voting is isolated from other activities, not dynamic, and often requires the entire group to stop while a central facilitator initiates the voting tool. Dynamic normative influence is difficult to investigate, and empirical studies of dynamic groups are relatively rare (Sniezek, 1992, p. 139) . In contrast, the process here envisaged is public, ongoing, voluntary, and threaded within mainstream communications, much as informal voting is proposed to occur during FTF group discussions (Hoffman & Maier, 1964) . The effect is that the individual is aware of the group position at all times. This experiment illustrated how this can be done. Using this method, computer-mediated groups on current distributed networks, such as the Internet, could enact agreement.
Voting as Social Influence
Using voting as a social as well as a rational tool offers new ways of interaction such as voting before discussing (Whitworth & McQueen, 1999) . It can also create problems. Online voting not only shows the group position, it influences it. Social voting is influence as well as information, and computer polls of public opinion can change the very opinion they purport to measure. In small groups, this causes order effects to occur. The first members to declare their position influence the rest, and the last may encounter powerful normative influence. Hence, in this experiment, participants could not see the group position until they voted and could not vote again until everyone in the group had voted. If exchanging positions has such powerful effects, groupware must provide some system guarantee of vote integrity to avoid unethical manipulations. Repeat votes must also be recognized, distinguishing 10 votes from 10 different people from 10 votes from the same enthusiastic individual. One solution is an unalterable "signature" to verify the communication, whether e-mail or e-vote.
Interaction Protocol
Computer-mediated interaction (CMI) makes demands beyond computer-supported interaction (CSI). CSI adds computer support to existing FTF interaction, which allows synchronous facilitator control. However CMI replaces FTF interaction, and so must also replace those synchronous controls techniques with asynchronous ones. In essence, the software must take on the role of facilitator. FORUM DGSS devolved control to end users, who worked at their own pace. At any moment during the experiment, no one knew who was working on what (except the computer), as people might be all on different questions. Voting was initiated at the individual level, not through a central facilitator starting the voting tool, as occurs in the "tool kit" groupware design approach (Daniels, Dennis, Hayes, 658 SMALL GROUP RESEARCH / October 2001 Nunamaker, & Valacich, 1991) . Participants did not all work on Question 1 together and then move to Question 2 and so on. Initially, some participants tried this, waiting for others to vote before moving on, but soon dropped this approach and began using the "To Do" function to hop from question to question, wherever voting was required. The computer knew what they had and had not done and made it seem as if the group was gathered there at the moment they came to vote. The need for synchrony to keep order disappears if the computer keeps order.
FINAL WORD
The C3P model suggests that although factual IE is important, an equally significant proportion of group activity may be simply a push for agreement, regardless of logic. The idea of groups as rational individuals exchanging task information to arrive at logical solutions may be a false one. If real life problems rarely respond to rational analysis (Daft et al., 1987) , to rely on reason alone is unwise. We should not presume nature got it wrong in providing alternatives to reason. Friendships extend our perspective beyond the present selfish moment. Groups extend us to consider more than our small self. The view that what is good for the group is good for its members has a lot to commend it. Likewise, without friends we could trust no one, and reason fails without trustworthy information. But, is not normative influence just "herd instinct" that turns individuals into automatons that mindlessly follow a mindless group (Janis, 1972) ? To think this is to think the processes proposed are mutually exclusive. They are not. Normative influence works better when each group member individually thinks through the problem to the best of his or her ability. Indeed, not to think for yourself is not to contribute. Group identification requires individuals to act from a group perspective, not to act as robots. For example, given half the questions asked had no objectively correct answer, the frequency of "don't know" responses (2.1%) seems low. Why did participants not choose "don't know" more often on the straw votes? Perhaps because it is not helpful to the group. If everyone responded this way, no group position could emerge. If each individual makes his or her best choice, normative influence simply gives the group closure on the choice that best represents the group.
Without normative influence, the cities and societies we live in would not exist. What is disparagingly called conformity is also the essential "glue" that holds us together in an equivocal world. Group identification can extend individuality as well as deny it, as confidence and motivation increase when people are not alone but part of a larger group. This nonrational process makes us social beings. As a part of our nature, we must accept it. This "irrational" process may be the only solution to prisoner's dilemma problems, where rational but selfish individuality ensures that everyone loses (Poundstone, 1992) . Groupware design should be based on what groups actually do, not what we think they do or would like them to do. Computer-mediated groups need normative influence for the same reason FTF groups do: to generate group unity. Without unity, groups cannot act as groups. Rather than trying to eliminate such "irrationality", or regarding it as a "flaw" of human nature, groupware designers should recognize and accept this cohesive process as a valuable aspect of what groups actually do. Support for group influence and the generation of agreement should be an essential feature of any groupware system.
